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Initial Public Offerings.pdf
InitialPublic OfferingsJay R. RitterCordell Professor FloridaGainesvilleFL 32611-7168(352) 846-2837j
2
HELMET OFFERINGS - Revision Military.pdf
HELMET OFFERINGS - Revision Military
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HKMCI Product Solution Offerings 2009.pdf
HKMCI Product Solution Offerings 2009
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The Marketing of Seasoned Equity Offerings.pdf
Accelerated seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), which include bought deals and accelerated bookbuilt offers, have increased dramatically in the U.S. and globally recently. Accelerated offers are cheaper than traditional fully marketed offers in terms of direct issue costs. To explain why some issuing firms choose a fully marketed offer instead of an accelerated offer, we develop a model in which marketing flattens the issuer s demand curve. Empirical analysis shows that the pre-issue elasticity of the issuing firm s demand curve and the offer size are important determinants of the offer method. For an issuing firm that is average in other ways, if it has an above average relative issue size of 30% and an inelastic demand curve at the 90th sample percentile, the probability of using an accelerated SEO is only 0.8%. On the other hand, if the issuer has a below average relative issue size of 10% and an elastic demand curve at the 10th sample percentile, the probability of an accele
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BBVA, S.A. Offerings of Debt Securities.pptx
ClearyGottlieb J.P.MorganAdam Fleisher Neila RadinPamela MarcoglieseApril 23, 2013U.S. Securities Re
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Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation.pdf
AmericanFinance AssociationInitial Public Offerings UnderwriterReputationAuthor(s): Richard Carter S
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venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings.pdf
AmericanFinance AssociationVenture Capitalist Certification InitialPublic OfferingsAuthor(s): Willia
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The Choice between Public and Private Equity Offerings.pdf
This paper empirically examines the determinants of the choice between private and public offerings and of the expected price discounts by usinga new database. The estimates indicate that public investors prior information and the risk measures are, by a large margin, the two most important determinants of the likelihood of private placements. My argument on the determinants of the expected price discount, if private placement buyers are ex ante informed investors, draws on models by Maksimovic and Pichler (1999) and Rajan (1992). One view holds that the expected price discount is driven by the cost of motivating the truth-tellingvalueofprivateinformation (Maksimovic and Pichler (1999)). A competing view holds that informed investors are able to use their bargaining power obtained through informational advantages to require strictly positive expected excess returns, which are not directly relatedtothevalueofthe private information (Rajan (1992)). Overall, I find that private placements to
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Institutional allocation in initial public offerings: empirical evidence.pdf
Institutional allocation in initial public offerings: empirical evidencein,In
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The revival of shelf-registered corporate equity offerings.pdf
We report that traditional seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) are no longer firms preferred choice for raising seasoned public equity. Traditional offerings have recently been surpassed by shelf- registered offerings in terms of both annual frequency and total capital raised. This represents a dramatic shift from the 1980s, during which the overwhelming majority of firms favored traditional over shelf-registered offerings. We find that the growth in shelf use is related to firms increasingly valuing and using the option feature of shelf registration to defer or abandon offerings. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the way firms now use shelf offerings resolves the shelf under- certification problem and results in smaller market penalties and lower underwriter fees relative to non-shelf offerings. Finally, firms often use universal shelf filings and choose between debt and equity offerings based on the prevailing relative market conditions.

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